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ROBINSON-PATMAN TREATMENT OF INTERSTATE FIRMS
INJURED BY LOCAL COMPETITORS
THE Robinson-Patman Act,' unlike the Sherman Act,2 establishes a regu-
latory scheme of lesser compass than the congressional power over interstate
commerce. 3 Literally, the statute reaches only those marketing offenses com-
1. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, 13b, 21a (1952). The numbering
of the statute in the U.S.C. is confusing. See Vance v. Safeway, 137 F. Supp. 841, 845
(D.N.M. 1956). Sections 1 and 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act are set forth respectively
in title 15 U.S.C. as §§ 13 and 21a, while Robinson-Patman § 3 is labeled § 13a. Conse-
quently, subsection 1 (a) of Robinson-Patman reads § 13(a), thus distinguished from § 3 in
the U.S.C. only by parentheses. The confusion is enhanced by the fact that § 1 of Robinson-
Patman amends § 2 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §
13 (1952), and is often referred to as "§ 2 of the Clayton Act, as amended."
2. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1952).
3. See Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670, 675-76 (S.D. Cal. 1951). The
Sherman Act prohibits: "Every contract ...in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states . . ." and any attempt to monopolize or any monopoly of ". . . trade
or commerce among the several states . . . .", 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2
(1952). By this language, Congress intended to exercise fully its power to regulate
commerce. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945);
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 495 (1940)); Myers v. Shell Oil Co., supra.
Early decisions had severely restricted the Sherman Act through definitions excluding
production and manufacturing from the scope of interstate commerce. See, e.g., United
States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). Subsequent Supreme Court decisions respond-
ing to the need for federal control, however, greatly expanded the concept of interstate com-
merce and thereby revived the Sherman Act. See cases collected in Mandeville Island Farms,
Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 230-31 (1948). Finally, Houston, E. & W.
Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914), extended federal power over commerce to all
activities, no matter how local, if a substantial effect on interstate commerce resulted. The de-
velopment of this doctrine rendered a determination of where interstate commerce ends
and intrastate commerce begins no longer necessary in defining the limits of federal
power. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., .supra at 232.
For a history of the expansion of the interstate commerce concept, see id. at 229-35. See
also United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222, 226-27 (1955).
The Sherman Act, therefore, may today condemn some "local" restraints of trade.
See, e.g., United States v. Employing Plasterers Ass'n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954) (local agree-
ments of labor union, contractors' association and union president dictating who could
buy plastering materials in the local market held subject to the act) ; Mandeville Island
Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., sutpra (refiner's price-rigging of intrastate
purchases from local beet growers illegal under Sherman Act) ; see also REPoRT OF THE
ATroRNEY GENmAL'S NATIONAL Commirrun To STUmY THE ANTITusT LAwS 64
(1955) (hereinafter cited as Arr'y GEN. REP.). However, restraints of trade
purely local in scope and effect remain beyond the Sherman Act's reach. See, e.g.,
Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933) (conspiracy to supress local
building operations not subject to Sherman Act); Spears Free Clinic and Hospital for
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mitted by "any person engaged in [interstate] commerce, in the course of such
commerce ... where either or any of the [discriminatory] purchases . . . are
in commerce."'4  Strict interpretation, however, may impede the principal
Poor Children v. Cleere, 197 F2d 125 (10th Cir. 1952) (medical association's restriction
on chiropractic practice in Colorado held local); Atlantic Co. v. Citizens Ice & Cold
Storage Co., 178 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1949) (no Sherman Act violation where defendant
engaged in interstate commerce cut prices on local sales injuring a local competitor).
4. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952). Since § 1(a) alone deals with price
discrimination, the other subsections prohibiting various marketing practices do not repeat
"where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce."
However, § 3 and all subsections of § 1 with the exception of (e) do require that the
violator be "engaged in commerce," and the offense be "in the course of such commerce."
These requirements have been read into § 1(e) in order to preserve its constitutionality.
Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 150 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.), cert denicd, 326
U.S. 773 (1945) ; Myers v. Shell Oil Co., supra note 3, at 675 n.11.
The jurisdictional language of the Patman bill as reported by the House committee was
considerably broader but was later narrowed to its present form. H.R. 8442, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1936). Since the substantial effect doctrine of the Sherman Act is inapplicable,
a business engaged solely in intrastate commerce has been assumed to be outside the scope
of Robinson-Patman regardless of any effect its discriminations may have on interstate
commerce. H.R. RE. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1936); AUSTIN, PaICE Dis-
CRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 15 (1952); Loevinger, Enforcement
of the Robinson-Patinan Act by Private Parties, in NE-w Yoa-c STATE BAR Ass'N, 1957
ANTITRUST LAw SYmpOSiUm, How To COMPLY WITH ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT 145 (here-
inafter cited as 1957 ANTITRUST SYmposi m). But see note 8 infra and accompanying text.
Similarly, concerns that fail to qualify as "engaged in commerce" have been held immune
from Robinson-Patman liability. See, e.g., Northern Cal. Monument Dealers Ass'n
v. Interment Ass'n, 120 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal. 1954) (no allegation that retail association
was supplied with granite from outside state or that interstate commerce had not ceased
before challenged sale) ; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Blade, 110 F. Supp. 96, 101-02 (S.D.
Cal. 1953) (no allegation that defendant engraving company shipped or received any goods
in interstate commerce.)
A more difficult, though closely related problem, arises in determining whether an
alleged Robinson-Patman violation occurred "in the course of interstate commerce." The
fact that a concern is in some way engaged in interstate business has been held not
sufficient in itself to satisfy this requirement. See Schlomchik v. Hygrade Bakery Co.,
1952-53 Trade Cas. 67632 (E.D. Pa. 1953) ; Sun Cosmetic Shoppe, Inc. v. Elizabeth Arden
Sales Corp., 81 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). Some courts, narrowly interpreting the
statute, have stated that the only transactions against which Robinson-Patman is directed
are those "that are actually performed in commerce." Myers v. Shell Oil Co.,
supra note 3, at 675-76; Lewis v. Shell Oil Co., 50 F. Supp. 547, 549-50 (N.D.
Ill. 1943). Retail sales have generally been considered entirely local. But ef.
Vance v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 137 F. Supp. 841, 844 (D.N.M. 1956). But sales to a
company which in turn sells the goods in interstate commerce may qualify as being in
the course of such commerce. See Central Ice Cream Co. v. Golden Rod Ice Cream Co.,
CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1958 Trade Cas.) ff 69017 (7th Cir. Apr. 23, 1958) ; cf., Corn
Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 745 (1945). A more important doctrine
increasing the application of Robinson-Patman to local activities of interstate firms is the
"stream of commerce" concept defining interstate commerce. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co.
v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 236-38 (1951) ("stream of commerce" not broken by temporary
local storage of gas before purchase and delivery on individual orders) ; Midland Oil Co.
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statutory aim-protection of small business from discrimination by large
interstate competitors.5 Countering this possibility, the Supreme Court in
Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co. found Robinson-Patman strictures offended
by a bread manufacturer engaged in commerce who lowered some intrastate
v. Sinclair Refining Co., 41 F. Supp. 436 (N.D. Ill. 1941) (less than tank car loads
of gasoline stored in bulk plants still "in course of interstate commerce" when sold
locally); Alabama Independent Serv. Station Ass'n v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 28 F.
Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1939). For the proposition that the Robinson-Patman Act, under
a broad stream of commerce doctrine, may sometimes extend further into local transac-
tions than the presumably broader Sherman Act, see Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1015-
16 (1952). Conversely, the "stream of commerce" under Robinson-Patman has also been
narrowly delimited. See, e.g., Lipson v. Socony Vacuum Corp., 87 F.2d 265 (1st Cir.
1937) (gasoline shipped into Massachusetts to supply long-term contracts of local dealers
held insufficient to support conclusion that such gasoline remained in interstate com-
merce); Lewis v. Shell Oil Co., supra (gasoline of defendant engaged in interstate
commerce shipped intrastate to plaintiff a purely local transaction).
5. The Supreme Court, in justifying the application of the "stream of commerce"
doctrine to the local transactions of a large interstate corporation, noted: "Such sales
are well within the jurisdictional requirements of the Act. Any other conclusion would
fall short of the recognized purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act to reach the operations
of large interstate businesses in competition with small local concerns." Standard Oil
Co. v. FTC, supra note 4, at 237-38. See also note 7 infra.
The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act reveals that it was a hastily
drafted product of the depression era, designed primarily to protect wholesalers and
small retailers against the increasingly prevalent chain store methods of distribution. See
Rep. Patman's statement: "Chain stores are out. There is no place for chain stores in
the American economic picture," quoted in McNair, Marketing Functions and Costs
and the Robbison-Patman Act, 4 LAW & CoNTaiP. PROB. 334 n.1 (1937). Commentators
early recognized Robinson-Patman as an anti-chain-store measure. Learned & Isaacs,
The Robinson-Patuan Law: Some Assumptions and Expectations, 15 H.Av. Bus. REv.
137 (1937); McNair, supra. For recent detailed studies discussing the anti-chain-store
interests that sponsored the Robinson-Patman Act, see Rowe, The Evolution of the
Robinson-Patman Act: A Twenty Year Perspective, 57 CoLUM. L. REv. 1059, 1061-67
(1957) (hereinafter cited as Rowe, Robinson-Patman Evolution) ; PALAMOUNTAiN, TEE,
POLIrICS OF DisrmunioN c. VII (1955). "This political origin of the Robinson-Patman
Act has passed beyond controversy into the annals of history." Rowe, Price Differentials
and Product Differentiation: The Issues Under the Robinson-Patnan Act, 66 YALE L.J.
1, 2 n.6 (1956) (citing surveys) (hereinafter cited as Rowe, Price Differentials). Never-
theless, fear that specialized legislation would be unconstitutional persuaded the sponsors
of the statute to couch it in sweeping and generalized terms. 80 CONG. REc 6429 (1936).
Thus, the effect of the statute has been felt in all corners of the economy by both large
and small businesses. Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confusion: Another
Look at Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 930-31 (1951) (hereinafter cited as Rowe,
Price Discrimination) ; Rowe, Price Differentials, at 2-3; see note 47 infra. For discus-
sion of the Clayton Act deficiencies leading to passage of the Robinson-Patman Act, see
AUsTIN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 5-11; Hamilton & Loevinger, The Second Attack on
Price Discrimination: Tie Robinson-Patman Act, 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 153 (1937). For
detailed studies of the historical and legislative background of Robinson-Patman, see
PALAMOUNTAIN, op. cit. supra at 58-89, 159-235; Rowe, Robinson-Patman Evolution, at
1059-74; and surveys compiled in Rowe, Price Differentials, at 2 n.5. The substantive
revisions of the Clayton Act effected by Robinson-Patman are briefly described in id. at
7-9; AUsTIN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1-4.
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prices yet maintained others, interstate as well as local.6 The proscribed dis-
crimination had occurred, in the Court's view, even though the injured com-
petitor and the transactions causing harm were intrastate and the volume of
interstate sales was negligible.7
6. 348 U.S. 115 (1954). Plaintiff was a local baker doing business solely in Santa
Rosa, New Mexico. Mead, the defendant, was also in the bakery business and sold
its products in Santa Rosa, as well as across the state line in Farwell, Texas. It was
one of several corporations located in New Mexico and Texas which had interlocking
ownership and management. To counter a boycott agreement induced by plaintiff among
the local merchants in Santa Rosa, defendant cut its prices in that town while maintaining
prices in other towns, including Farwell, Texas. A price war ensued and continued
from September 1948 to April 1949, when plaintiff was forced to close his business. There-
upon, plaintiff brought a treble damage action, alleging violation of § 1 (a) of the Robin-
son-Patman Act. See id. at 116-17. The district court's dismissal of the suit was affirmed
by the court of appeals, which held that plaintiff was in pari delicto with defendant and,
in passing, expressed doubt if sufficient effect on interstate commerce to bring the action
within the scope of Robinson-Patman had been shown. Moore v. Mead Service Co., 184
F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1950). The Supreme Court, in Moore v. Mead Service Co., 340 U.S.
944 (1951), granted certiorari, vacated the judgment and remanded the case for con-
sideration in the light of its holding in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951), denying the pari delictd defense in private antitrust suits. See
notes 23 and 52 infra. The district court, on remand, held that the fourth proviso of §
1 (a), allowing price discrimination to meet changed market conditions, was applicable
and again dismissed the action. See Moore v. Mead Service Co., 190 F.2d 540, 541 (10th
Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 902 (1952). The circuit court reversed and remanded,
stating that the changing conditions proviso was not intended to cover price war situations
as presented by the facts of the case. Moore v. Mead Service Co., supra: see note
24 infra. Judgment of $68,400 was then awarded plaintiff by the district court. Mead's
Fine Bread Co. v. Moore, 208 F.2d 777, 779 (10th Cir. 1953). But the circuit court again re-
versed on the ground of insufficient effect on interstate commerce. Mead's Fine Bread
Co. v. Moore, .supra. Reversing, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment and award
of the district court. Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954).
7. These facts had been found controlling by the circuit court: "The suppressive
effect of the discriminatory sales on competition at Santa Rosa ... did not reach beyond
the jurisdiction of New Mexico and cannot therefore be found to be within the 'effect'
provisions of § 13(a) of the Clayton Act, as amended [§ 1(a) of Robinson-Patman]."
Mead's Fine Bread Co. v. Moore, 208 F.2d 777, 780 (10th Cir. 1953). The court was
following a Fifth Circuit decision requiring that a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce be demonstrated in private actions brought under the Robinson-Patman Act. Id.
at 781. See Atlantic Co. v. Citizens Ice & Cold Storage Co., 178 F.2d 453 (5th Cir.
1949) (action brought under § 3 of Robinson-Patman as well as § 2 of Sherman Act
remanded to district court because of inconsequential effect on interstate commerce);
cf. Northern Cal. Monument Dealers Ass'n v. Interment Ass'n, 120 F. Supp. 93, 95 (N.D.
Cal. 1954). The Supreme Court, however, in reversing the Moore circuit court and
rejecting this doctrine, stated: "If this method of competition were approved, the pattern
for growth of monopoly would be simple. As long as the price warfare was strictly
intrastate, interstate business could grow and expand with impunity at the expense of
local merchants. The competitive advantage would then be with the interstate combines,
not by reason of their skills or efficiency but because of their strength and ability to wage
price wars." 348 U.S. at 119.
For discussions of competitive and public injury under Robinson-Patman, see Rowe,
Price Differentials, at 18-21, and surveys collected at 19 n.7 8; AiiY Grx. rzyp. 160-66.
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Spurred by the Moore decision, a federal district court in Bownman Dairy
Co. v. Hedlin Dairy Co. allowed an interstate competitor to recover for the
local acts of a local seller.8 Plaintiff was a dairy which, for purposes of the
decision, was assumed to sell its product in interstate commerce. It sought
treble damages on the ground that defendant, a local dairy, had offered dis-
criminatory price discounts, gifts of merchandise and interest free loans to
plaintiff's customersY No allegation of injury to plaintiff's interstate business
was made.' 0 Asserting that none of the alleged practices occured in interstate
commerce, defendant moved for summary judgment.": The court denied the
motion and held that since under Moore plaintiff "would be amenable to suit
filed by the defendant it must be accorded a similar right to file suit in its own
behalf under the act.' u 2 Further support was found in a statement of a spon-
sor of the statute, quoted in Moore, that a purpose of Robinson-Patman was
"to protect interstate commerce itself from injury by influences within the
The Supreme Court in More appeared to be applying § 3 as well as § 1 of Robinson-
Patman. 348 U.S. at 117-18. Section 3 makes it unlawful "for any person engaged
in commerce . . . to sell . . . goods . . . at unreasonably low prices for the
purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a competitor." 49 STAT. 1526 (1936),
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952). But recently, in Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355
U.S. 373 (1958), the Court disallowed private actions under § 3; Moore was ruled no
authority to the contrary since a § 1 violation had been found and resolution of the § 3
issue was therefore not essential to decision. Id. at 376 n.5. Significantly, the Department
of Justice has never brought proceedings under the vague criteria of § 3. See id. at 378 n.7.
8. 126 F. Supp. 749 (N.D. Ill. 1954).
9. Ibid. The action was brought under §§ 2(a), 2(d), 2(e) and 16 of the Clayton
Act, as amended.
10. 126 F. Supp. at 750.
11. Id. at 749. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
12. Id. at 750. The court appeared to be influenced by the philosophy of "mutuality
of remedies" primarily associated with the law of contracts. Cf. 69 HARv. L. REv. 769,
770 (1956). This doctrine affirmatively grants specific performance to the plaintiff in an
action for breach of contract, even though he is not otherwise entitled to it, if the de-
fendant could have obtained it against him. 5 CoRBNn, CONTRACTS § 1178 (1951). Thus,
the equitable remedy is given to the injured party although recovery of damages might
be fully adequate. Note, 36 Gao. L.J. 220, 221 (1948). The principle upon which the
affirmative doctrine is based appears to be the maxim that "equality is equity." This
generality, while founded on broad concepts of fairness, has been justifiably criticized
as not valid in many factual contexts. 5 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 1182 (1951). Nevertheless,
the affirmative mutuality doctrine, giving an alternative remedy where an adequate one
may already be available, has not been as severely attacked as the negative doctrine
which denies specific performance where the defendant could not have had such a remedy
against the plaintiff. Id. at § 1179. The affirmative doctrine in restricted form is sup-
ported by the Restatement of Contracts. 1 R.STAT mENT, CONTRACTS § 372 (1932). And
even the negative doctrine still finds some application in the federal courts. Note, 36
GEo. L.J. 220 (1948). For general criticisms of the concept of mutuality, see Ames,
Mutuality in Specific Performtance, 3 CoLum. L. REv. 1 (1903) ; Stone, The "Mutuality"
Ride in New York, 16 COLUM. L. REv. 443 (1916) ; see also Cook, The Present Statis of the
"Lack of Mutuality" Ride, 36 YALE L.J. 897 (1927).
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state."' 3 This indication of congressional intent, coupled with the presumed
inequity of denying mutuality of remedies, was deemed sufficient to justify
liability despite the seemingly unambiguous statutory language to the con-
trary.14
Nevertheless, arguments can be mustered in favor of the Bowman conclu-
sion. The court considered Moore as condemning all discrimination by inter-
state firms which injured local competitors.' 5 So construed, the decision went
beyond the jurisdictional language of the statute to effect its basic policies.'
Conceivably, then, the Bowman court followed a Moore instruction to deviate
from the letter of the act where equity required.1 7 More important, the threat
of treble damage recoveries, available to competitors in private antitrust suits,
is a serious deterrent to the employment of marketing schemes within the
scope of the statute.' s On this view, Moore enhances the ability of intrastate
13. 126 F. Supp. at 750. But see notes 41 and 42 infra and accompanying text.
14. The court did not, however, expressly refer to the language of the statute.
15. The Supreme Court in Moore used broad language in finding the local price war
of the interstate defendant within the Robinson-Patman Act. It stated: "We have here
an interstate industry increasing its domain through outlawed competitive practices. The
victim, to be sure, is only a local merchant; and no interstate transactions are used
to destroy him. But the beneficiary -is an interstate business; the treasury used to finance
the warfare is drawn from interstate, as well as local, sources which include not only
respondent, but also a group of interlocked companies engaged in the same line of
business... Y" 348 U.S. at 119. The district court, writing shortly after Moore, ap-
parently accepted this sweeping language as a holding that all price discriminations, no
matter how local, by interstate businesses were within the scope of Robinson-Patman.
See note 12 supra and accompanying text. But see notes 28 and 29 infra and accompanying
text. Similarly, some commentators employ this broad interpretation of Moore, See 39
MINN. L. REv. 908, 910 (1955) (the "employment of economic resources of interstate com-
merce to destroy local competition is not permissible"); 34 NEB. L. RE.v. 721, 723
(1955) (the Moore decision reaches "the outer boundary of federal power in holding that
a strictly intrastate situation which has no effect on interstate commerce can be controlled
through the commerce clause because the profits and finances of an interstate organization
are used to attain an end the antitrust laws seek to prohibit"). But see 69 HARv. L. REV.
769 (1956) ; 33 N.C.L. R.v. 712 (1955) ; note 28 infra and accompanying text.
16. The broad interpretation of Moore, meaning that all price discriminations by
businesses engaged in interstate commerce are within the jurisdiction of § 1(a) of
Robinson-Patman, would read out of the statute the language requiring that the dis-
crimination be "in the course of such [interstate] commerce" and only ". . . where either
or any of the [discriminatory] purchases . ..are in commerce." See note 4 supra and
accompanying text.
17. But see text at note 28 infra.
18. Violations of the Robinson-Patman Act are subject to prosecution by two govern-
mental agencies-the FTC and the Department of Justice. 38 STAT. 734, 736 (1914),
15 U.S.C. §§ 21, 25 (1952). In fact, however, the Department of Justice has not been
active in the civil enforcement of Robinson-Patman. See, Rowe, Price Differentials,
at 4 n.9. Nevertheless, the act remains the most enforced of the antitrust statutes. Rowe,
Robinson-Patmam Evolution, at 1075. This in part stems from the right of private
enforcement provided by § 7 of the Sherman Act, as amended by § 4 of the Clayton
Act, to persons injured "in . .. business or property by ... reason of anything forbidden
[in the antitrust laws] ... . " 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952). While this
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merchants to police the local pricing activities of their interstate competitors. 19
Absent Bowman, on the other hand, an interstate business is virtually de-
fenseless against a local competitor who uses discriminatory practices to in-
provision lay dormant until the end of World War II, a decision in Bruce's Juices v.
American Can Co., 87 F. Supp. 985 (S.D. Fla. 1949), aff'd, 187 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.),
modified, 190 F2d 73 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 875 (1951), awarding
claimant a $220,000 judgment, awakened Te bar to the potentials of this type of action.
Since that time, private antitrust suits have become increasingly popular. See Comment,
61 YAIE L.J. 1010 (1952), and appendix statistics at 1063-65; ArT'y GEN. REP. 378; Mor-
ton & Cotton, Robinson-Patman Act-Anti-Trust or Anti-Consumer?, 37 Minn. L. Rev.
227, 242 (1953). Such suits constitute an unusual combination of public regulatory and
private compensatory functions. Arr'Y GEN. R P. 378. Public interest in enforcement, how-
ever, is often said to override the private equities of the litigants. Trebuhs Realty Co. v.
News Syndicate Co., 107 F. Supp. 595, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) ; see Northern Cal. Monument
Dealers Ass'n v. Interment Ass'n, 120 F. Supp. 93, 95 (N.D. Cal. 1954) ; cf. D. R. Wilder
Mfg. Co. v. Corn Products Refining Co., 236 U.S. 165, 173-74 (1915); Bruce's juices,
Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751-52 (1947). In any event, private suits today
provide an essential supplement to antitrust enforcement. See McConnell, The Treble Dam-
age Issue: A Strong Dissent, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 342, 345 (1955) ; Loevinger, supra note 4, at
162. That the private antitrust suit will continue to perform this function is indicated by the
limited enforcement facilities and personnel of the FTC and the antitrust division of the De-
partment of Justice as revealed in congressional inquires. See Hearings Before Subcom-
mittee No. I of the House Select Committee on Small Business, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,
at 37-45 (1956); H.R. REP. No. 3236, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 75-76 (1951). On the other
hand, private antitrust actions also serve to compensate individual businesses for injuries
inflicted upon them by their competitors. Comment, 61 YAL. L.J. 1010, 1011, 1058(1952); Clark, Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in Private Anti-
Trust Suits, 52 MicH. L. REv. 363, 364 (1954). Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides
for compulsory treble damage recoveries. 38 STAr. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1952).
Potentially huge recoveries, while representing substantial financial burdens to defend-
ants, also provide important incentive to plaintiffs. Comment, 61 YAtm L.J. 1010, 1058-
59 (1952) ; see AT-r'y GEN. REP. 378; Business Week, April 22, 1950, pp. 59-60. Because of
the potential severity of treble damages and the distinct possibility, particularly under the
Robinson-Patman provisions, of innocent violation of the antitrust laws, a bill was intro-
duced in Congress to allow courts discretion to award either single or triple damages. See
H.R. REP. No. 4597, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1953). The proposal was foreshadowed in
the Attorney General's Report, which favored granting such discretion to the courts.
Arr'y GEN. REP. 378-80. However, strong dissents have been voiced on the ground
that the ordinary antitrust treble damage recovery does not adequately compensate plain-
tiffs for the expenses and difficulties inherent in the nature of the suit. McConnell, supra;
Loevinger, supra note 4, at 160-61. Some commentators also maintain that, without the
continuing threat of treble damages penalties, much of the deterrent effect of private
actions would be lost. See, Wham, Antitrust Treble-Damage Suits: The Government's
Chief Aid in Enforcement, 40 A.B.A.J. 1061, 1062 (1954).
19. The drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act were well aware that treble damage
actions would be available to compensate individual competitors and anticipated that these
suits would aid in the enforcement of the provisions of the statute. See 80 CoNG. REc.
3116, 6283 (1936). Liberalized pleading and proof of damage requirements have aided
Robinson-Patman plaintiffs. See, generally, Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1022-27, 1033-
37 (1952); Clark, supra note 18. While the number of private Robinson-Patman suits
has not been great (75), and the final judgments for plaintiffs much fewer (6), court
cases do not adequately indicate the importance of the availability of such suits to
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crease its hold locally.20 It would not be able to sue for damages since the
aggressor is not in commerce.21 Nor could it safely employ economic sanctions,
for retaliatory action could yield a treble damage suit.2 2 And because the
defenses of part delicto and unclean hands are currently of doubtful utility
in private antitrust suits, 23 only the defenses specifically recognized in the
competitors. See, Loevinger, siepra note 4, at 158-63; Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1059
(1952). "We can say with assurance .. . that the great bulk of bona-fide treble damage
claims are settled... before suit is brought.... In other words, the court's records on treble
damage actions are of little significance." Letter from Jerrold G. Van Cise, member of
Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, to the Yale Law
Journal, Jan. 2, 1952, on file in Yale Law Library. In addition to the substantial possi-
bility of financial settlement, a very important feature of treble damages is the advantage
threat of suit affords concerns to whom such actions are available. The knowledge that
a competitor can bring suit undoubtedly induces competitive concessions from threatened
businesses. See Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1060 (1952) ; Loevinger, spra note 4, at 162-
63; cf. Cotton, supra note 18, at 242. But see 41 MlNN. L. REv. 830, 832 (1957). Therefore,
to the extent that the Moore case expands the Robinson-Patman liability of interstate
concerns, the regulatory power of their local competitors is correspondingly increased.
20. Local concerns are not unfamiliar with such practices. See note 46 infra. The
controversy in the Moore case itself arose as a result of an attempt by the local bakery
to cut its interstate competitor completely out of the Santa Rosa market. Moore v. Mead
Service Co., 184 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1950). Cf. Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms
Co., 231 F.2d 356, 366 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 991 (1956) (upholding
a blanket price cut by a large interstate dairy in the Los Angeles area as necessary
to eliminate a great many of the "chiselling cuts, special advantages and rebates given
by its competitors in this very area"). For a factual description of the many local dairies
in competition in the Los Angeles vicinity and the frequent changes in prices made by
these companies, see Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 104 F. Supp. 796, 803-04
(S.D. Cal. 1952).
21. See note 4 supra and accompanying text. The circuit court recognized this
limitation in its first opinion denying plaintiff a recovery in the Moore litigation: "Had
the plaintiff been engaged in interstate commerce, the combination would have been in
violation of the foregoing section [§ 14 of the Clayton Act]." Moore v. Mead Service
Co., 184 F.2d 338, 339-40 (10th Cir. 1950).
22. The thrust of the Supreme Court's Moore holding, even if narrowly interpreted,
is to make interstate concerns accountable to local competitors for deviations from
Robinson-Patman marketing standards, for the most part irrespective of the essentially
local scope of the competition. See note 32 infra.
23. Technically, pari delicto bars relief only where the plaintiff was in some manner
a participant in the same illegal transaction that caused the injury. The broader concept
of unclean hands bars recovery to anyone who has engaged in illegal activity bearing
some significant relation to the defendant's violation. See Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1010,
1028 (1952).
While the statutory authority for these defenses was uncertain, see Bushby, The
Unknown Quantity in Private Antitrust Suits-The Defense of in Par Delicto, 42 VA.
L. REv. 785, 787-88 (1956), both were held to be available to defendants in antitrust
actions. On part delicto, see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Blackmore, 277 Fed. 694, 693 (2d
Cir. 1921) (plaintiff barred from recovery as a participant in defendant's price fixing
scheme which ultimately damaged plaintiff) ; Bluefields S.S. Co. v. United Fruit Co., 243
Fed. 1, 3 (3d Cir. 1917), dismissed per stipulation, 248 U.S. 595 (1919) (same result
where plaintiff signed an illegal contract with defendant for the noncompetitive importa-
tion of bananas); Mid-West Theaters Co. v. Co-Operative Theaters, 43 F. Supp. 216,
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223-24 (E.D. Mich 1941) (plaintiff barred from recovery in action for damages resulting
from defendant's refusal to allow plaintiff to participate in illegal activities). On unclean
hands, see, e.g., Singer v. A. Hollander & Sons, Inc., 202 F.2d 55, 59 (3d Cir. 1953)
(suit for injunction under Sherman Act denied because "plaintiff has hands which all the
perfumes of Arabia would not sweeten") ; Maltz v. Sax, 134 F.2d 2, 4 (7th Cir.), cert.
dcnied, 319 U.S. 772 (1943) (maker of illegal "punch boards" denied recovery) ; cf.
Spencer v. Sun Oil Co., 94 F. Supp. 408, 412 (D. Conn. 1950) (members of retail
gasoline dealers association denied right to injunction under Robinson-Patman). How-
ever, a number of exceptions to these defenses have been developed. Thus, one who has
severed himself from the illegal transaction can recover for all injuries incurred after
the severance. See, e.g., Victor Talking Mach. Co. v. Kemeny, 271 Fed. 810, 818 (3d Cir.
1921) (plaintiff permitted to recover for defendant's refusal to sell goods in period
after plaintiff's participation). See also Connecticut Importing Co. v. Continental Distilling
Corp., 129 F.2d 651 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 664 (1942). Again, where the plain-
tiff was coerced into the illegal transaction, the courts have rejected the defenses of pari
delicto and unclean hands. See, e.g., Ring v. Spina, 148 F.2d 647, 652 (2d Cir. 1945) (plaintiff
coerced into illegal monopolistic agreement to protect $50,000 investment) ; Allgair v.
Glenmore Distilleries Co., 91 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (plaintiff coerced into paying
extra compensation to defendant's designees).
Recent Supreme Court opinions have cast further doubt on the utility of these defenses
in future private antitrust suits. See Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1028-30 (1952). In
Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 344 U.S. 219 (1948), the
Court rejected defendant's claim that the participation of plaintiff beetgrowers in contracts
forming part of the illegal arrangements precluded them from recovery of treble damages
under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. See Mandeville Island Farms, Inc., v. American
Crystal Sugar Co., 64 F. Supp. 265, 267-68 (S.D. Cal. 1946) (accepting the defense).
The Supreme Court dismissed the point summarily, stating that the monopolistic practices
of defendant "fall squarely within the Sherman Act's prohibitions, creating the very
injuries they were designed to prevent, both to the public and to private individuals....
It is enough that these petitioners have suffered the injuries for which the statutory
remedy is afforded." 334 U.S. at 242-43 (1948). And in Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951), the Court held that plaintiff's partici-
pation in illegal price fixing unconnected with the defendant's violation of the Sherman
Act was no defense for that violation. Citing its Mandeville holding, the Court reasoned:
"If petitioner and others were guilty of infractions of the anti-trust laws, they could
be held responsible in appropriate proceedings brought against them by the Govern-
ment or by injured private persons. The alleged illegal conduct of petitioner,
however, could not legalize the unlawful combination by respondents nor immunize
them against liability to those they injured." Ibid.
Finally, the Supreme Court may have gone further in its dismissal of the pari delicto
defense in the Moore case. See note 6 supra. The circuit court had denied recovery
in recognition of the fact that plaintiff's own illegal boycott agreement had induced
defendant to respond with a local price cut. Moore v. Mead Service Co., 184 F.2d
338, 340 (10th Cir. 1950). Certiorari was granted, and the case was remanded with the
direction that it be given further consideration in the light of the Kiefer-Stewart holding.
340 U.S. 944 (1951). The Tenth Circuit in turn remanded the case to the district court
for trial, stating that, although the facts of the Kiefer-Stewart case were "substantially
different," since the Supreme Court had there held that "in an action for treble damages
under the Sherman Act . . . infractions of such law by the claimant were not a defense
in such an action," that holding must control. 190 F.2d 540, 541 (10th Cir. 1951). The
fact that a competitor's illegal practices actually induced the defendant's retaliatory price
discrimination thus appears to provide no defense in a treble damage Robinson-Patman
suit. But see note 52 infra.
Subsequent lower court decisions interpreting the three Supreme Court opinions have
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Robinson-Patman Act could be invoked in such an action.24 True, discrimina-
generally acknowledged that in private antitrust actions the defenses of pari delicto and
unclean hands, if not completely abolished, are extremely limited. See, e.g., Interborough
News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 108 F. Supp. 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (plaintiff's par-
ticipation in an unlawful distributive monopoly no defense for defendant's violation of
the Sherman Act) ; Trebubs Realty Co. v. News Syndicate Co., 107 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.
N.Y. 1952) (defense that plaintiff was barred by unclean hands from alleging a Sherman
Act violation in attempting an illegal monopoly in booking plays rejected after analysis
of Supreme Court decisions) ; cf. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern Railway Presi-
dents Conference, 155 F. Supp. 768, 829 (E.D. Pa. 1957) ; W. E. Plechaty Co. v. Heckett
Engineering, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 805, 806 (N.D. Ohio 1956) ; Vanity Fair Mills v. Cusick,
143 F. Supp. 452, 454-56 (D.N.J. 1956) ; Enterprise Industries, Inc. v. The Texas Co., 136
F. Supp. 420, 423 (D. Conn. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957) ; Myers v. Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670, 674 (S.D.
Cal. 1951). Some courts, however, have interpreted the Supreme Court opinions in a
manner which does not completely obliterate the par delicto defense. These courts main-
tain that, where the culpable participation of the plaintiff is as great as that of the
defendant, a true pari delicto situation exists and relief should be barred. See Pennsyl-
vania Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas Elec. Light & Power Co., 209 F.2d 131,
133 (4th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 960 (1954) (plaintiff as party to illegal contract
was in par delicto and therefore not entitled to recover damages sustained as a result
of the contract; Supreme Court cases distinguished factually) ; see also H. & A. Selmer,
Inc. v. Musical Instrument Exchange, Inc., 154 F. Supp. 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
While pari delicto and unclean hands find restricted applicability in private suits
under the federal statutes, some state antitrust laws explicitly incorporate the defenses.
See, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-116 (Supp. 1957); ARIz. CODE ANN. § 74-105
(Supp. 1954); cf. Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., stpra at 771;
Nmv YORK STATE BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE SPECrAL COmmiTTEE To STUDY THE NENW
YORK ANTITRUST LAWS 46a-47a (1957) (hereinafter cited NEv YORK STATE BAR ASs'N
REP.).
The alternative to pari delicto and unclean hands suggested by the Kiefer-Stewart
decision, and apparently accepted by the Tenth Circuit' in Moore, that the defendant subse-
quently bring his own treble damage action against the wrongdoing plaintiff, is a hollow
one for Mead. The circuit court had already implied that no such remedy was available
under § 3 of the Clayton Act, making it unlawful to sell goods "on the condition . . .
that . . . the . . . purchaser thereof shall not use . . . the goods . . . of a competitor,"
since Moore was not engaged in commerce. See note 6 supra. Cf. Spencer v. Sun Oil
Co., 94 F. Supp. 408, 412 (D. Conn. 1950). The same jurisdictional requirement prohibits
actions against local concerns that employ competitive methods outlawed by Robinson-
Patman. See note 4 supra. While under the specific facts of Moore, the plaintiff's boy-
cott agreement probably did constitute a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, 26 STAT.
209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952), difficulties involved in prosecuting a treble damage
action under that statute render relief doubtful. See note 27 infra. See, generally, note
52 infra.
24. Section 1 of Robinson-Patman recognizes four affirmative defenses for price
discriminations. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952). (1) Cost justifications.
The act allows price differentials representing only due allowance for differences in
certain costs. For analysis of this often illusory defense, see Arr'v GEN. REp. 170-75;
AUSTIN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 56-77; Taylor, How To Cost J$stify, in 1957 ANTIRrUST
SYiMosium 115; see also Adelman, The Consistency of the Robinson-Patman Act, 6 STAN.
L. REv. 3, 9-14 (1953) ; Rowe, Price Differentials, at 21; Sawyer, Cost Justification of
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tions made in good faith to meet competition are expressly countenanced.2-
But narrow construction, judicial vagueness and congressional attacks cast
doubt on the efficacy of this provision.26  Consequently, while the market
action of interstate competitors would, under Moore, be subject to local super-
Quantity Differentials, 1 ANTITRUsT BULL. 573 (1956); Comment, 49 Nw. U.L. REV.
237 (1954). (2) Proper selection of customers. The act does not prohibit refusals to sell
to particular purchasers. See Shaw's, Inc. v. Wilson-Jones Co., 105 F.2d 331 (3d Cir.
1939); AUSTIN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 78-79; Fortas, Aftrnative Legal Defenses, in
NEW YORK STATE BAR Ass'N, 1954 ANTITRUST LAW Sy posium 187, 199-200. (3)
Changes in market conditions. This proviso exempts "price changes from time to time
where in response to changing conditions affecting the market for or the marketability
of the goods concerned .... ." While judicial interpretations have not yet crystallized the
scope of the defense-only two reported cases discuss it-the Tenth Circuit in the Moore
case held that a local boycott by a competitor was not sufficiently "similar" to the examples
of changing conditions listed in the proviso itself to constitute a defense for otherwise
unlawful price discriminations. The court evidently viewed the clause to cover only distress
goods situations. Moore v. Mead Service Co., 190 F.2d 540 (10th Cir. 1951) ; see Fortas,
supra, at 200. However, the Attorney Gewral's Report favors a broad interpretation of
the changing conditions proviso "to protect a seller's flexibility in adapting his prices to
perceptible market shifts, whether already underway or only impending." Arr'Y GEN.
REP. 177-79. (4) Finally, the statute exempts price discrimination "made in good faith
to meet an equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a
competitor." 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1952). See note 26 infra for a
discussion of this defense.
25. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1952).
26. The "good faith meeting of competition" proviso would seem to grant some
protection to interstate businesses finding themselves compelled to respond to local price
cuts. Indeed, the legislative history of Robinson-Patman indicates this to be the reason
for the preservation of the proviso in the text of the statute. "The seller is permitted
to meet local competition" in that "the proviso permits the seller to meet the price actually
previously offered by a local competitor." H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 16
(1936). However, through the year 1955, no seller accused of price discrimination had
successfully invoked the defense either before the FTC or the courts. Gwynne, Sonte
Features of the Federal Trade Commission Activities During 1955, in Naw YORK STATE BAR
Ass'N, 1956 ANTITRUST LAW SYmpOsium 38, 39 (hereinafter cited 1956 ANTITRUST
Svztrosium) ; Avp'y GEN. REP. 181. The FTC has quite generally construed the defense
as narrowly as the courts would permit. See Fortas, supra note 24, at 196-99. In the 1951
Standard Oil case, the Commission contended that meeting a competitor's equally low
price operated only to rebut a prima facie case established by demonstrating sales at
different prices and would constitute no defense if further proof was made of competitive
injury caused by the challenged prices. Since competitive injury under the Robinson-
Patman Act has been easily assumed by the courts once a price differential is established,
the practical effect of the FTC's position would have been to emasculate the defense com-
pletely. See note 7 supra; Howrey, Good Faith Meeting of Competition, in 1957 ANTI-
TRUST SvPosrt 46, 53. The Supreme Court rejected the FTC's contention and held
the good faith defense to be an absolute one. Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231,
246-47 (1951).
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's opinion left many unanswered questions concerning
the elements of a successful good faith meeting of competition defense. See, generally,
A-r'y GEN. REP. 179-86; Rowe, Price Differentials, at 965-72. Its 1951 opinion implied
that the equally low price met must be a legal price. The Court, however, never explicitly
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vision, local aggressors would, absent Bowman, regularly enjoy immunity
from Robinson-Patman liability.
27
However, proper construction of the Moore opinion deprives the Bowman
holding of this justification. By. referring to the discrepancy between prices
stated this to be a sine qua non of a successful good faith defense, Standard Oil v. FTC,
supra at 238-47 & n.14, 250, and more recently held that in all events the burden of
showing that defendant knew the price it was meeting was illegal rested on the FTC.
FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396, 399-400 n.4 (1958). Nevertheless, since the issue
was not fully discussed, uncertainty remains concerning the need for "legality" in the
price met.
Furthermore, the good faith defense, strictly read, allows only an equalizing and not
a beating of a competitor's price. Such a reading renders the proviso nugatory in a price
war situation. See Rowe, Price Differentials, at 970-71; AT'y GEN. REP. 182-83.
The uncertainty of the scope of the statutory defense as judicially interpreted is
compounded by legislative activity aimed at clarification of the proviso. See Rowe, Pr*cc
Differentials, at 966 n.237. Recently, a proposal to limit the defense has gained consider-
able support in Congress. Identical Senate and House bills, S. 11, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1957) and H.R. 1840, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956), proposed that § 1 of Robinson-Patman
be amended to read that "unless the effect of the discrimination may be to substantially
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce" a good faith
meeting of competition is an absolute defense. H.R. 1840 was passed by the House in
the 84th Congress with only three dissenting votes. 102 CONG. REc. 10051-52 (1956).
For a discussion of the bill, see id. at 10025-51; Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1956). The likely effect of the proposed amendment, adopting the position rejected by
the Supreme Court in the Standard Oil case, would be to nullify the good faith defense.
See Howrey, supra, at 46-58.
27. Other statutes may, of course, provide some protection to interstate businesses
from price sniping by local competitors. A treble damage action might be brought under
§ 2 of the Sherman Act, which makes it illegal to "monopolize or attempt to monopolize
• . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States . . . !' 26 STAT. 209
(1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1952). A narrowed concept of the relevant market may enhance
the effectiveness of this section against local restraints of trade. See Arr'y GziN. REP. 44-48;
Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1011-12 (1952). Nevertheless, courts have generally
"required a high degree of market power before finding a violation of section 2." Note,
66 YALE LJ. 1251, 1254-55 (1957). Section 2 suits are further complicated by the neces-
sity of demonstrating defendant's "purpose or intent to exercise . . . [monopoly] power."
AT'v GrN. REP. 55-56. More important, the Sherman Act requires that a substantial
injury to the public interest be demonstrated by litigants alleging violation of either § 1
or § 2. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 500-01 (1940) ; Myers v.
Shell Oil Co., 96 F. Supp. 670, 674-75 (S.D. Cal. 1951) ; cases cited note 3 supra. The
inadequacy of the Sherman Act in alleviating undesirable conditions is attested to by
Congress' subsequent enactment of supplementary antitrust statutes outlawing specific
market practices. Note, 66 YAi.E L.J. 1251, 1253 n.7 (1957).
The Federal Trade Commission Act outlaws the use of "unfair methods of competi-
tion in commerce." 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (1952). Violations of
the Robinson-Patman Act quite likely constitute parallel violations of the FTC Act.
AUSTIN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 11. However, the latter act, in addition to requiring
that the unfair practices actually occur in commerce, FTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U.S.
349 (1941), provides no right of action to private litigants, Samson Crane Co. v. Union
Nat'l Sales, 87 F. Supp. 218, 221 (D. Mass. 1949). Similarly, the relevant Clayton Act
prohibitions are applicable only to those "engaged in commerce" and hence gives no
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in intrastate and interstate transactions, the Supreme Court clearly intended
to save the statutory language outlawing discriminations "where either or
any of the purchases involved . .. are in commerce." 28 Admittedly, the Court
rendered the "in the course of commerce" requirement superfluous by finding
it satisfied when the other jurisdictional criteria--discriminatory practice by
an interstate company and variance between local and out-of-state prices-
were met in even the most technical fashion.2 9 Still, the opinion is hardly a
protection against local snipers. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1952).
Finally, an injured interstate company may find protection from local agressors in
state antitrust laws. But the great diversity in the substantive provisions of state laws
makes reliance upon local statutes undesirable. For a survey of diverse state laws, see
answers to questionnaires, Nmv YORK STATE BAR Ass'N REP. 89a-116a; Comment, 32
COLUM. L. REv. 347 (1932). According to the CCH Trade Regulation Reporter compila-
tion of state antitrust laws, twenty-six states have price discrimination laws of a rough
equivalence to the Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts, while twenty-two do not. Some of
the latter states, however, do have special legislation dealing with price discrimination and
unfair trade practices in specific industries. 2 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1111 10201-15585 (1956).
In any event, enforcement of state statutes has been extremely lax. ATr'y GEN. REP. 349;
Javits, The Role of State Antitrust Laws, in 1956 ANTITRUST SYMPoslium 56; see also NEv
YORK STATE BAR Ass'N REP. 7, and the replies to questionnaires distributed to sister
states, id. at 89a-116a. And state laws provide little opportunity or incentive for private
enforcement. Over half the states do not provide for private damage suits based on anti-
trust violations. FORKOSCH, ANTITRUST AND THE CoNsumaa 335 (1956) ; Comment, 32
CoLUm. L. REv. 347, 353 (1932). Many of those states that do permit private suits provide
only for recovery of actual damages. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-106 (Supp. 1957) ;
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 19.90.090 (1957). A few states provide for recovery of double
damages and costs. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.38 (Supp. 1957) ; OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 1331.08 (Page Supp. 1957). Finally, in a limited number of states triple damages
are recoverable. See, e.g., IDAHo CODE ANN. § 48-204 (Supp. 1957) ; MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 51-111 (Supp. 1957) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-5-14 (Supp. 1957). Actions under
some state laws are limited by the explicit acceptance of the pari delicto defense. See
note 23 supra.
28. 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1952). The Supreme Court did not con-
sider itself to be deviating from the jurisdictional language of the Robinson-Patman Act: "As
we have shown, the facts charged and found read upon the words of the statute." 348 U.S. at
120. The Court throughout its opinion emphasized that Mead had been "maintaining the price
in interstate transactions and cutting the price in intrastate sales," that "the prices on the
interstate sales, both by respondent and by the other Mead companies, are kept high
while the local prices are lowered" and that therefore "the profits made in interstate
activities would underwrite the losses of local price-cutting campaigns." Id. at 118, 119.
Consequently, the assumption of the Bowman court that even entirely local discriminations
by interstate concerns fall within the Robinson-Patman prohibitions is premature. See
69 HARv. L. REv. 769, 770 (1956) ; 33 N.C.L. RFv. 712, 713-14 (1955) ; 6 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 385, 386 (1955). But see notes 15 supra, 32 infra.
29. The local price cuts which caused the injury in the Moore case, though clearly
in the course of the defendant's business, were not in the course of interstate commerce,
as that criterion had been understood. COurts had interpreted the Robinson-Patman re-
quirement that violations be in the course of the violator's interstate commerce as de-
manding more than that the general business of the defendant encompass activities crossing
state lines. See note 4 supra; Shlomchik v. Hygrade Bakery CO., 1952-53 Trade Cas. ff
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license for wholesale deviation from apparent jurisdictional requisites. 30 With-
in this framework, the Bowman attempt at mutuality fails. Under Bowinan,
interstate businesses enjoy an unqualified right of action against their local
competitors; yet Robinson-Patman liability of interstate firms for local trans-
actions is limited by Moore to those situations in which prices of interstate
sales are maintained to "underwrite the losses of local price cutting cam-
paigns."'" In some circumstances, therefore, an interstate business may ju-
diciously limit the scope of its discrimination to escape suit by a local com-
petitor.32 To this extent, Bowman combines with the proper interpretation
67632 (E.D. Pa. 1953) ("in order for the sales here involved to come under the ...
Robinson-Patman Act, they must have been made in interstate commerce. The fact that
the defendant conducts other business across state lines is not enough"). Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court in Moore found that the price discrepancy between sales by Mead
in the one out-of-state town it serviced and those made in Santa Rosa a differential
meeting the language of the statute prohibiting discriminations "where either or any of
the purchases ... are in commerce," 49 STAT. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952), coupled
with the fact that defendant was a member company of a group extensively engaged in
interstate commerce, satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of the statute. 348 U.S. at
118. In so holding, the Court rendered superfluous the additional requirement that the
discrimination be in the course of "such [interstate] commerce." The Court did not discuss
the problem but said that the discrimination was in the course of defendant's business
-apparently accepting this as sufficient to "read upon the words of the statute." Id. at
120.
30. See note 28 supra. Broad deviations from the jurisdictional language of other
antitrust statutes have been rejected by the Supreme Court. In FTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312
U.S. 349 (1941), the FTC asserted that the language of the Federal Trade Commission
Act giving the Commission power to prosecute unfair practices "in commerce" actually
meant "in any way affecting commerce." The Court stated that the obvious meaning of
the language should be adhered to unless the purpose of the act would be defeated by
such a reading. Some of the factors considered in rejecting the FTC position were:
that for a quarter of a century the statute had not been construed in this broad manner;
that when Congress has desired to protect commerce to the fullest extent of its power,
it has normally conveyed its purpose explicitly; and that the broad construction would
extend federal control over myriad local businesses in matters previously left to local
law or custom. All these factors apply equally to the Bowman court's manipulation of
the Robinson-Patman Act.
31. 348 U.S. at 119. See note 28 snpra. The Boinan opinion in no way restricted
the right of action it gave interstate businesses against the market discriminations of
local competitors. See note 16 supra.
32. This could be done by lowering prices on all interstate sales as well as local sales
designed to implement the price war while maintaining other intrastate prices. By thus
keeping the discrimination purely local, an interstate business could avoid the differential
between inter- and intrastate sales critical to the narrow interpretation of the Moore
opinion. See note 28 supra.
Undoubtedly, however, the theoretical loophole from Robinson-Patman liability pro-
vided by the narrow reading of Moore will not prove economically significant to many
interstate businesses. The market place would not normally allow price-setting for the
purpose of avoiding Robinson-Patman treble damage liability. Cf. Balian Ice Cream Co.
v. Arden Farms Co., 104 F. Supp. 796, 805 (S.D. Cal. 1952). Moreover, any lowering of
prices on interstate sales in state A for the purpose of safely effectuating a discriminatory
price reduction in a local price war in state B would give protection only if no com-
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of Moore to effect a substitution of interstate business as the more highly
protected class under Robinson-Patman-a result clearly inconsistent with
the primary aim of the act.
33
In the recent case of Central Ice Creant Co. v. Golden Rod Ice Cream Co.,34
the Bowman court retreated from its prior holding. Plaintiff, an Illinois ice
cream manufacturer, alleged that it was engaged extensively in interstate com-
merce and that defendant, whom the court considered a purely local com-
petitor,35 had unlawfully "launched a campaign to solicit away most of
plaintiff's customers 'in the Chicago area.' "31 Defendant moved to dismiss,
asserting that none of the acts complained of had occurred in the course of
interstate commerce. Reiterating the desirability of protecting interstate inter-
ests,3 7 the court refined the Bowman approach, "in view of the unambiguous
language of the statute, '38 and granted defendant's motion on the ground that
no injury to plaintiff's interstate business had been alleged.3 9
Central accordingly attempts to afford some statutory protection to inter-
state competitors yet avoid the anomalous readjustment of safeguards oc-
casioned by Bowman. Apparently, Central would allow a private Robinson-
Patman suit against a local company when the plaintiff's interstate business
had suffered from defendant's conduct.40 While the statute no more sanctions
this position than it does Bowman, the statement of Congressman Utterback,
a sponsor of the act, that Robinson-Patman "protect(s) interstate commerce
itself from injury by influences within the state" may grant some support to
Central, though not to Bowman.4 ' Placed in context, however, the statement
petitors in A were injured. For otherwise these competitors could themselves file a
Robinson-Patman suit for treble damages.
33. See note 5 supra.
34. 153 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Ill. 1957).
35. The court was later reversed on this point. Central Ice Cream Co. v. Golden
Rod Ice Cream Co., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1958 Trade Cas.) ff 69017 (7th Cir. Apr.
23, 1958).
36. 153 F. Supp. at 686. Violation of the Sherman Act was also alleged, but this
allegation was subsequently abandoned. Ibid. Violations of other statutes not here relevant
were also asserted. Ibid.
37. The court stated that it "... was led to its conclusion in the Bowman case by
consideration of the injustice which would result from holding that the remedies of plain-
tiff and defendant so situated are not mutual . . . ." Ibid.
38. Id. at 686-87.
39. Id. at 687-88. No such allegation had been made in Bowma,. See note 10 supra.
40. 153 F. Supp. at 686. The court repeated that it was led to its conclusion in
Bowman by two considerations: mutuality and legislative intent to protect interstate com-
merce from injury by influences within the state. Ibid. In Central, however, it relied ex-
clusively on legislative intent. Id. at 686-87.
41. This language can in no way support the Bowtmn position. For, in Bowman,
the court assumed for purposes of the motion to dismiss that the plaintiff sold its
product in interstate commerce and not that defendant's activities had somehow injured
the interstate part of plaintiff's business. 126 F. Supp. at 750. Hence, Congressman
Utterback's statement, concerned with the protection of interstate commerce rather than
interstate competitors, is not apposite. The Central court, on the other hand, required
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is probably irrelevant to both holdings.42 In any event, the substantive effect
of Central is far from clear. If "injury to interstate business" is construed
liberally, any injury to a firm with some interstate trade would suffice.43
Central would then become no different from Bowman except that, geared
to the policy of protecting commerce rather than achieving mutuality, it
avoids logical inconsistency. 44 If, on the other hand, the holding requires that
damages be sustained directly by interstate activities, substantial room for
local sniping of interstate business would remain. 45 Similarly, the more preva-
lent interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act denies interstate businesses
effective recourse against economic aggressions by intrastate concerns.4"
This competitive disadvantage, however, need not foster the protection of
an interstate plaintiff bringing a private Robinson-Patman action against a local competitor
to allege and presumably to prove injury to its "interstate business." 153 F. Supp. at 687.
While the exact nature of the proof required to substantiate such an allegation is uncer-
tain, see notes 43, 45 infra and accompanying text, the court manifestly attempted to
justify its extension of Robinson-Patman on the basis of protection of interstate com-
merce and thereby made pertinent Congressman Utterback's pronouncements. 153 F. Supp.
at 686. But see note 42 infra.
42. In his speech, Congressman Utterback said: "Where a manufacturer sells only
to customers within the State, his business is beyond the reach of Federal authority and
is not included within the provisions of this bill." 80 CoNG. REc. 9416 (1936). He then
proceeded to contrast the effect of the statute on those who sell both within and without
state lines. An interstate company, he continued, can neither favor interstate business
to the disadvantage of local business "nor . . . local trade to the injury of ... interstate
trade." Congressman Utterback then made the remarks quoted in Bowman and Central.
Thus, his statement must be read in the limited context of a company engaged in interstate
commerce and discriminating in favor of local trade to the detriment of interstate trade.
Id. at 9417. To say that Congressman Utterback intended to espouse the idea that "one
of the purposes of the Act was 'to protect interstate commerce itself from injury by influences
within the State,' " 153 F. Supp. at 686, is, therefore, clearly an overstatement. See also
the general legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act, note 5 supra (favoring a
narrow interpretation of Congressman Utterback's remarks).
43. Such a reading would be comparable to the Bowman court's broad but dubious
construction of Moore. Just as under that construction all discriminations by an inter-
state business are placed "in the course of commerce" through the assumption that the
resources of an interstate treasury would be utilized, see note 15 supra, all injuries inflicted
upon a business engaged in such commerce would burden the interstate treasury and there-
fore constitute "injury to interstate business."
44. Since the Central court abandoned mutuality as a goal, see note 40 supra, failure
to attain it no longer constitutes a logical inconsistency. However, the Central doctrine
does remain inconsistent with the statutory language. See notes 4, 41 supra and accompany-
ing text.
45. Under this interpretation, an interstate concern which lost only local sales because
of the discriminatory pricing of a local competitor could not recover damages. Thus, while
the Moore opinion, properly read, allows a loophole of only doubtful practical importance
for interstate concerns, see notes 30, 31 supra, a narrow reading of Central would afford
intrastate companies wide room for pirating and leave unresolved the problems which the
court sought to remedy, see notes 12-14 supra.
46. See note 4 supra and accompanying text. A great many local restraints on inter-
state commerce do exist. See ATT'y GEN. REIP. 349; Javits, supra note 27, at 56-57, 59;
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small, independent merchants from abuses of economic power-the principal
aim of the statute. "Inter" and "intra" cannot be equated with "large" and
"small" business. 47 Even if equation were possible, the Robinson-Patman Act
creates an opportunity for discrimination disclaimed by its proponents when it
immunizes "small" local merchants from retaliation by "larger" interstate con-
cerns.4 8 Nevertheless, as analysis of the Bowman and Central decisions reveals,
equitable results are neither properly nor effectively attained by wholesale judi-
cial disregard of the jurisdictional limitations explicitly enunciated in the statute.
Perhaps legislative amendment to afford some affirmative Robinson-Patman
protection to interstate business would resolve the problem. But any extension
of the doubtful substantive provisions of the statute would be open to criti-
cism. 49 A more promising solution, and one well within the traditional ambit
NEW YORK STATE BAR Ass'N REP. 7. Moreover, even when jurisdictionally applicable
antitrust laws are violated by local restraints, the FTC, the Department of Justice and
state authorities often fail to prosecute. Ibid.
47. The sponsors of Robinson-Patman repeatedly spoke in terms of "large" and "small"
businesses, though the language of the statute, of course, differentiated only between inter-
and intrastate competitors. See, e.g., 80 CONG. REc. 8115, 9416 (1936). Manifestly, how-
ever, an intrastate firm cannot be equated with small business, nor an interstate with
large. Indeed, the Robinson-Patman Act, although limited to concerns engaged in inter-
state commerce, has been and will continue to be applied to small as well as big business
in interstate trade. See Howrey, supra note 26, at 49; cf. Levy, How To Meet Price
Competition, in 1957 AxrTausr SYmposIum 103; Rowe, How To Comply With Section
2(c)-(f), in 1957 AIMTRUST SvrosIUM 124, 141. Such application is particularly onerous to
small retailers and wholesalers since they, more than other sellers, must be responsive
to competitive pricing. Howrey, supra note 26, at 54-55. Conversely, businesses that are
able to qualify as purely local in the scope of their activities, and thus escape Robinson-
Patman liability, are not necessarily "small." The possibility that devices such as local
sales subsidiaries could be used by large interstate corporations to avoid the threat of
Robinson-Patman was early called to the attention of Congress. 80 CONG. RE . 8124
(1936). Subsequent cases indicate that subsidiaries have to some degree been so utilized
with success. See Massachusetts Brewers Ass'n v. P. Ballantine & Sons Co., 129 F. Supp.
736 (D. Mass. 1955); cf. Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Philco Corp., 148 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y.
1957) (Philco Corporation and wholly owned distributor subsidiary held not to be "same
seller" and therefore price discrimination provision of Robinson-Patman inapplicable).
48. The legislative history of the Robinson-Patman Act is replete with statements
that the purpose of the act was not to establish a privileged class of competitors but only
to establish equal opportunity for all. See, e.g., 80 CoNG. Rrc 3446, 3447, 8111, 8122
(1936).
49. The Attorney General's Report acknowledges the ease with which the Robinson-
Patman Act might be innocently violated by businessmen who failed to understand its
vague and complex substantive provisions. A-r'v Gzx. REP 378. See also Ruberoid Co.
v. FTC, 189 F.2d 893, 894-95 (2d Cir. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 470, 492 (1952) (dissenting
opinion) ; Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 65 (1953) (dictum). Some eco-
nomic premises of the act have been soundly, exhaustively and very nearly unanimously
criticized by scholars. For a lengthy survey of scholarly critiques, see Rowe, Price Differ-
entials, at 34 n.141. A legislative amendment expanding the scope of Robinson-Patman to
permit treble damage suits against intrastate competitors and thereby increasing the
impact of the statute on the economy is, therefore, not to be suggested lightly.
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of the judiciary, would be to vitalize the statutory "good faith meeting of
competition" defense 5o and to develop and employ the time-honored doctrines
50. The failure of both judicial and administrative interpretation to provide a mean-
ingful good faith meeting of competition defense to businesses engaged in interstate com-
merce was undoubtedly instrumental in causing the Bowman decision. See note 26 supra;
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Scnate Co'lnzittce
on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., ser. 15479, at 716 (1956). The defense was retained
in the Robinson-Patman text for the express purpose of permitting a seller to meet the com-
petition of local competitors. H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1936). The Su-
preme Court has likewise recognized that Robinson-Patman did not intend to abolish the
good faith defense. "None of these changes however cut into the core of the defense. That
still consists of the provision that wherever a lawful lower price of a competitor threatens
to deprive a seller of a customer, the seller, to retain that customer, may in good faith
meet that lower price. Actual competition, at least in this elemental form, is thus pre-
served." Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 242 (1951). In rejecting the FTC's
restrictive interpretation, the Court stated "it is enough to say that Congress did not seek
by the Robinson-Patman act either to abolish competition or so radically to curtail it that
a seller would have no substantial right of self-defense against a price raid by a com-
petitor." Id. at 249. The Attorney General's Report strongly commends the Supreme
Court's views and suggests that the following broad interpretations be given the defense
to end its current lack of effectiveness: the unlawfulness of the equally low price met
should not bar the defense unless it was known or ought to have been known by the price
discriminator; price cuts allowed should not be limited to "sporadic" or "isolated"
occasions; and in view of the realities of business, there should be a reasonable modification
of the often stated limitation that the defense allows one to "meet but not beat" a com-
petitor's prices. Arr'z GEar. REP. 181-84.
While the defense has not proved useful in the past, very recent developments hold
promise. The Supreme Court, writing the last chapter in the seventeen-year Standard Oil
litigation, again affirmed the validity of the good faith defense on the facts of that case.
FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396 (1958). Though recognizing that a good faith
defense would have been precluded if Standard's price discrimination had been pursuant
to a general price system, the Court affirmed the findings of fact of the circuit court that
such was not the case. The opinion emphasized that "both major and local suppliers made
numerous attempts in the 1936-1941 period to lure these 'jobbers' away from Standard
with cut-rate prices, oftentimes much lower than the one and one-half cent reduction
Standard was giving them." Id. at 372-73. Furthermore, the fact that the prices met were
not standing offers but sporadic, if recurring, price raids by pirating competitors was not
felt to be controlling. The good faith defense allowed Standard to meet such competitive
conditions by continued price differentiations. Id. at 373 n.8. Moreover, the Supreme
Court made it clear that the burden was upon the Commission to prove that the prices met
were illegal. Since there was no "showing or serious contention by the Commission" that
the offers were unlawful, Standard's good faith defense was in no way impaired. Id. at
371 n.4. Unquestionably, the Court intended in this, as in its last Standard Oil pronounce-
ments, to give meaning to the good faith proviso. This foundation may lead to a rejection
of the "soft competition" premise of Robinson-Patman and allow interstate businesses
a full measure of freedom in matching the price concession of local competitors. In this
manner, the market contest for trade will protect interstate competitors while consumers
will benefit from more vigorous competition. Cf. Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden
Farms Co., 104 F. Supp. 796, 800-02 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (most liberal lower court holding
to date allowing interstate business to meet local competition through economic retaliation
rather than retaliatory litigation).
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of pari delicto and unclean hands5 1 Perhaps properly limited in treble damage
actions under the Sherman Act, where the interest of the community in pro-
tecting competition is primary, these latter defenses should not be restricted
in Robinson-Patman suits where the principal aim must be admitted to be pro-
tection of competitors. 52 Recognition of all these defenses would honor the
statutory language, protect local competitors who did not themselves dis-
criminate, and allow injured interstate concerns to defend themselves in the
marketplace.
51. A reasonably broad interpretation of the good faith meeting of competition defense
will not provide completely adequate protection to interstate concerns. The deficiency is
illustrated by the Moore case, in which the intrastate competitor was restraining the local
market not through price slashes but by a boycott of all other bakers. "Meeting Moore's price
here would have been wholly ineffectual. He had a monopoly, not by reason of price, but
by reason of a boycott agreement. Mead met the boycott confronting it, in the only effective
way it could." Moore v. Mead Service Co., 190 F.2d 540, 542 (10th Cir. 1951) (concurring
opinion). While a federal treble damage action under other antitrust laws may be avail-
able in such cases, the protection given by these acts is inadequate. See note 27 supra.
In any event, competitive retaliation on the market place is often preferable to cross
litigation in the courts.
The "changing market conditions" proviso, if interpreted as broadly as recommended
by the Attorney General's Report, would provide opportunity for self-defense against a
great variety of unfair restraints by local competitors. See note 24 supra. As a body of
restrictive case law has not yet developed to cripple this proviso, courts in the future may
develop it into a needed supplement to the good faith defense. Beyond explicit statutory
provisos, the defenses of pari delicto and unclean hands are well suited to permit interstate
competitors self-defense. See note 52 infra.
52. The recent fate of the defenses in antitrust litigation has been one of crippling
restriction. See note 23 supra. The principal rationale given in rejecting pari delicto and
unclean hands in private treble damage actions has been the overriding public interest in
efficient antitrust enforcement. 'Whatever equities may be present as between private
litigants, they must yield to the overall public policy of the antitrust laws to prevent
monopolies and restraint of trade .... Defendant's view [claiming unclean hands], fully
spelled out, would mean that when respective litigants are both engaged in anti-trust viola-
tions, the wrongful conduct of each is a defense to the other's suit, with consequent dismissal
of the complaint and a standoff. In effect the misconduct of each serves to immunize the
other from liability. The public interest is caught in the cross-fire of wrongful conduct
by the litigants, with both free to continue their illegal activities until such time as the
government shall intervene. On the other hand, permitting the prosecution of the respective
claims by each of the parties, unburdened by the defense of 'unclean hands,' would, if suc-
cessful, result in judgment and decree against each wrongdoer." Trebuhs Realty Co. v.
News Syndicate Co., 107 F. Supp. 595, 599-601 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); see also Interborough
News Co. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 108 F. Supp. 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); cf. Kiefer-Stewart
Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 214 (1951). Some commentators
concur in this reasoning. See 54 COLUM. L. REv. 984 (1954); 51 COLUTm. L. Rtv. 523
(1951). But see 53 COLUM. L. REv. 739 (1953) ; 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1463 (1954).
However, the argument overlooks several important factors. The basic assumption of
the reasoning is that the public interest will be furthered by allowing both the plaintiff
and defendant to bring treble damage actions against each other for their respective
antitrust violations. But this position disregards the restricted ability of interstate busi-
ness to sue competitors whose activities are confined to one state. See notes 21, 27 supra.
Moreover, the restrainer who is immune from treble damage actions knows that, should
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he lose on the market, he will nevertheless recoup treble his losses by suing the interstate
retaliator. See Comment, 46 ILL. L. REV. 654, 662 (1951); 29 N.Y.U.L. Rs'. 1463,
1470 (1954).
More important, under the Robinson-Patman Act, private interests far outweigh public
concern in effective enforcement. The Sherman Act, to be sure, is designed to protect
,the public against undue limitations on competitive conditions. See, generally, Arr'v
GEN. REP. 5-12. And, therefore, to permit the misconduct of a plaintiff as a defense to a
suit under the Sherman Act may indeed adversely affect the public. Significantly, the
cases rejecting pari delicto and unclean hands because of overriding public interest are
generally actions brought under the Sherman Act. See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Interborough News Co. v. Curtis Pub-
lishing Co., 108 F. Supp. 768 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Trebuhs Realty Co. v. News Syndicate
Co., 107 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); see also W. E. Plechaty Co. v. Heckett Engineer-
ing, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 805, 806 (N.D. Ohio 1956) (unclean hands defense denied because
"it is in the public interest to have the validity of a questioned patent determined");
Enterprise Industries, Inc. v. Texas Co., 136 F. Supp. 420 (D. Conn. 1955) (in action
for violation of Robinson-Patman, pari delicto defense "not applicable . .. for plaintiff
... was, if anything, a victim" of the price discrimination) ; cf. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v.
Cusick, 143 F. Supp. 452, 454-56 (D.N.J. 1956) (plaintiff's violation of Robinson-Patman
not sufficient for unclean hands disqualification because no necessary relation existed be-
tween plaintiff's and defendant's actions). But cf. United Cigar-Whelan Stores Corp. v.
H. Weinreich Co., 107 F. Supp. 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (plaintiff not barred by pari delicto
from having a contract violative of Robinson-Patman declared void although plaintiff
was himself a party to the contract). The Supreme Court in Moore implied that the same
public interest was -represented by the Robinson-Patman Act, in remanding the case
in light of Kiefer-Stewart. However, the circuit court expressed some reservations and
noted that the facts of the Moore case were "substantially different," but it ultimately
denied pari delicto. See note 23 supra. Some sponsors of Robinson-Patman did maintain
that the act was designed to protect the consuming public. See, e.g., 80 CONG. REG. 8116
(1936). Nonetheless, the actual purpose of the act, safeguarding weak competitors rather
than competition, was admitted by others. See, e.g., 80 CONG. REc 8103, 8109, 8110 (1936).
The Supreme Court has upon several occasions recognized the basic inconsistencies be-
tween the Sherman Act and Robinson-Patman. Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S.
61, 74 (1953) (duty to reconcile § l(a), in so far as the statute permits, with Congress'
broader antitrust policies); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951) ("we
need not now reconcile, in its entirety, the economic theory which underlies the Robinson-
Patman Act with that of the Sherman and Clayton Acts") ; cf. Nashville Milk Co. v.
Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958) (§ 3 of Robinson-Patman Act not part of antitrust
laws for purposes of private causes of action). While the Attorney Gewral's Report
takes the position that through wise judicial interpretation Robinson-Patman may be used
to promote the public interest in free competition, it implies that the primary function of
Robinson-Patman as passed was the protection of individual competitors. AT'y GEN.
REP. 163-66; see also id. at 166-67 (dissent). Commentators have long recognized
this is to be the statute's aim. See 80 CONG. Rac. 8119 (1936). See also PALAIMOUNTAIN,
TjE PouTics oF DISTmBUTION 230-31 (1955) ; EDVARDS, MAiNTAiNINr CoMamTIoN 166-
69 (1949) ; Morton & Cotton, supra note 18, at 227 ("With the passage of the Robinson-
Patman Act in 1936 a new notion entered anti-trust law-protection of competing business-
men"; rival competitor, rather than consumer, is protected) ; Smith, Effective Competition:
Hypothesis for Modernizing the Antitrust Laws, 26 N.Y.U.L. REv. 405, 450 (1951) ("Free-
dom of competition in the public interest would be enhanced by use of the public interest test,
as per the Sherman Act, in all decisions, as opposed to the individual interest of competitors
as under the [Robinson] -Patman Act) ; Rowe, Price Discrimination, at 974 (Robinson-
Patman "both antithetical to antitrust policy and unnecessary for antitrust enforcement") ;
Rostow, Monopoly Under the Sherman Act: Power or Purpose?, 43 ILL. L. REv. 745, 749
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(1949) ("... Robinson-Patman Act . . . operate[s] fundamentally to restrict rather than
to encourage competition") ; Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61
HARv. L. REv. 1289, 1334-47. (1948) (effects of the act could only be to safeguard not com-
petition, but competitors) ; Learned & Issacs, The Robinson-Patiman Law; Some Assump-
tions and Expectations, 15 HARV. Bus. REv. 137, 139 (1937) (". . . an anti-competition
statute slipped into the anti-trust laws") ; McAllister, Price Control by Law in the United
States: A Survey, 4 LAW & CONrEM . PROB. 273, 290 (1937) (Robinson-Patman an anti-
chain-store measure which must take its place with other measures of like import). Thus,
no overriding public interest in Robinson-Patman enforcement should obstruct reinstate-
ment of pari delicto and unclean hands as defenses in suits brought under that statute.
A local competitor need not, of course, be barred from recovery of treble damages
for injuries sustained after it had discontinued its own unfair restraints. Moreover, other
mitigating circumstances, such as plaintiff's bargaining disadvantage, could readily be taken
into consideration in weighing the defenses. See cases cited note 23 supra. And unclean
hands should continue to be applicable only where plaintiff's acts had some relation to de-
fendant's violation. See Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244-
46 (1933) ; Vanity Fair M\1ills, Inc. v. Cusick, supra at 454-56; United States v. Cotton
Valley Operators Comm., 75 F. Supp. 1, 7 (W.D. La. 1948). By reviving these defenses
in the Robinson-Patman context where they have never been explicitly rejected by the
Supreme Court, open market competition rather than cross litigation can be encouraged-
a development in conformity with the basic goal of antitrust administration.
